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POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATION·s.* By 
Charles R. Beitz. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1979. 
Pp. ix, 212. $16.50. 
To paraphrase Francis Bacon, some authors prepare tasty snacks 
- small, richly flavored morsels of thought that go down easily and 
leave the reader with the pleasant aftertaste of civilization. Others 
produce heavier meals, feasts that must be approached with respect, 
devoured in small bites, and chewed well. In Political Theory and 
International Relations, Charles Beitz presents ideas that require 
thorough digestion, but chops them up to disguise them as light 
snacks. Unfortunately, his carving shows. 
Beitz's thesis is that a normative political theory of foreign affairs 
is possible. In essence, he argues that skepticism toward moral judg-
ments in international relations (which he calls "international skepti-
cism") must proceed from a pervasive skepticism about the place of 
morality in all political theory. If moral judgments are accepted as 
appropriate in domestic politics, then analogous principles can be 
derived that must have equivalent force in the international sphere. 
The book argues this point, then illustrates it by outlining the inter-
national analogues of John Rawls's difference principle in domestic 
distributive justice. 
In Part I, Beitz presents and refutes arguments in favor of inter-
national skepticism. His primary target is the view - shared by 
Raymond Aron and others - that international politics is an exam-
ple of Thomas Hobbes's state of nature. According to that view, 
nothing exists to compel nations to comply with moral rules that 
conflict with their self-interest. And without assurance of reciproc-
ity, each nation will follow its self-interest because unilateral compli-
ance is irrational. 
Beitz identifies two flaws in the analogy between the state of na-
ture and foreign affairs. First, empirically, the world does not seem 
to fit Hobbes's mold. Unlike a person in the state of nature, a nation 
is neither self-sufficient nor a unitary source of ends. Indeed, nations 
are not the only significant actors in world politics: their decisions 
can be influenced by transnational groups, such as large corpora-
tions. They are also subject to peaceful coercion through censure, 
economic embargo, and other sanctions. Because of these weaken-
ing factors, Beitz notes that nations can have common interests and 
can rationally expect mutual compliance with rules that foster those 
interests. Unfortunately, Beitz fails to explain the practical impor-
tance of these expectations. If the analogy between international re-
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lations and the state of nature is imperfect, then a theory of foreign 
affairs derived exclusively from Hobbes is incomplete. Yet the state-
of-nature model's failure to account for areas of reciprocal compli-
ance may be either fatal or trivial, depending upon the strength of 
the expectations and the range of activities in which they arise. A 
gap between theory and observation does not necessarily extinguish 
the value of the analogy. 
Second, Beitz criticizes the analogy on theoretical grounds. Most 
Hobbesian theorists assume that the survival of nations is the ulti-
mate moral goal. Beitz rejects this assumption: 
The argument that states should pursue their own interests in the 
absence of reliable expectations of reciprocal compliance with common 
rules depends on the analogy drawn between persons in the interper-
sonal state of nature and states in international relations. . . . 
Those who wish to apply Hobbes's argument to international rela-
tions should say that the parties to the international state of nature, 
when it is used as a device for showing which rules of conduct are 
rational, are to be conceived as persons rather than as states. This state 
of nature is international in the sense that the parties to it are of diverse 
citizenship. But they are still persons, and their choice of rules for the 
behavior of states (in such a revised Hobbesian view) is guided by their 
desire to preserve themselves as persons rather than simply to preserve 
their states as state. . . . 
. . .[N]othing is gained, and considerable clarity is lost, by attempt-
ing to justify principles of international conduct with reference to their 
effects on the interests of states. It is the rights and interests of persons 
that are of fundamental importance from the moral point of view, and 
it is to these considerations that the justification of principles for inter-
national relations should appeal. [Pp. 51-55.] 
Again, Beitz criticizes international skepticism without explaining 
why his criticism is important. He does not describe circumstances 
in which a citizen's conception of his individual self-interest diverges 
from his conception of the national interest. To the extent that these 
two interests are identified with each other, Betiz amends the anal-
ogy in a minor detail, but does not destroy its probative value. 
Having rejected international skepticism, at least in its purest 
form, Beitz struggles to give substance to his international moral 
principles. In Part II, he attacks the second most popular formula-
tion of international political theory, which he calls "morality of 
states." This theory, traced to the writings of Samuel Pufendorf and 
others, also draws an analogy between nations and people. Unlike 
international skepticism, however, it concludes that nations have a 
right of autonomy that insulates them from external moral criticism 
and political interference. Thus, nations have rights of self-determi-
nation, free from foreign intervention and economic imperialism. 
Beitz argues that the morality of states analogy is also flawed. He 
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contends that a state's claim to national autonomy is only justified 
when it respects the autonomy of its citizens. "[T]he claim that un-
just states should not be accorded the respect demanded by the prin-
ciple of state autonomy follows from the claim that it is only 
considerations of personal autonomy, appropriately interpreted, that 
constitute the moral personality of the state" (p. 81 ). 
Beitz next outlines his own theory, drawing heavily on John 
Rawls. He begins with unborn parties in a hypothetical "original 
position"who know they must cooperate to produce goods and serv-
ices. They do not know their nationalities, their roles, their abilities, 
or their proximity to natural resources. Their task is to agree on 
principles to govern the distribution of goods and services. Beitz ar-
gues that they would conform to Rawls's "difference principle," 
agreeing to depart from perfect equality only when the departure 
would increase the total benefits received by the least advantaged 
person. Such a global difference principle has important implica-
tions for the allocation of natural resources: 
In the case of natural resources the parties to the international orig-
inal position would know that resources are unevenly distributed with 
respect to population, that adequate access to resource is a prerequisite 
for successful operation of (domestic) cooperative schemes, and that 
resources are scarce. They would view the natural distribution of re-
sources as arbitrary in the sense that no one has a natural prima facie 
claim to the resources that happen to be under one's feet. The appro-
priation of scarce resources by some requires a justification against the 
competing claims of others and the needs of future generations. Not 
knowing the resource endowments of their own societies, the parties 
would agree on a resource redistribution principle that would give each 
society a fair chance to develop just political institutions and an econ-
omy capable of satisfying its members' basic needs. [P. 141.] 
A new perspective on foreign aid emerges from this global difference 
principle: . 
Once the existence of global redistributive obligations founded on jus-
tice is recognized, however, the view of aid as charity must be given up. 
It is inappropriate to regard foreign assistance as discretionary in the 
way charitable contributions are, nor can the attachment of political 
conditions be easily defended . . . . Furthermore, one cannot ac-
knowledge a duty of justice to contribute to economic development 
elsewhere without acknowledging that existing legal property rights 
lack a firm moral foundation. Aid should not be regarded as a volun-
tary contribution of a portion of a state's own wealth, but rather as a 
transfer of wealth to redress distributive injustice. [Pp. 172-73.] 
Political Theory and International Relations is frequently provoc-
ative. Beitz points out, for instance, that definitions of impermissible 
foreign intervention are oversimplified. If the goal is to protect indi-
viduals' autonomy (a goal usually served by nonintervention), then 
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intervention may be justified if it reforms a society's unjust institu-
tions. Thus, a complete ban on intervention is unjustified. 
Despite its insights, however, the book remains frustrating. Beitz 
resembles a professor who attempts to explain a thousand years of 
Western civilization in sixty minutes; 183 pages cannot accommo-
date his many intricate ideas. Surely Locke deserves more than a 
few scattered paragraphs (pp. 59, 60, 78-79), and Rousseau more 
than a few footnotes (p. 33 n.47, p. 45 n.75, p. 62 n.106). A measured 
pace and a longer book would have provided more satisfactory read-
ing. 
Moreover, Beitz wanders from his mission. He sets out "to work 
out a more satisfactory international normative political theory" (p. 
vii), yet the reader suffers through the first two thirds of the book 
waiting for him to get started. During this initial period, the author 
laborio~sly develops the more general and less interesting proposi-
tion that some kind of international political theory based on indi-
vidual autonomy is possible. Sadly, he squanders most of his energy 
defending that proposition in abbreviated battles with Morgenthau, 
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Grotius, Wolff, and a host of other opponents. 
When he reaches Rawls's theory, he is too tired to argue its wisdom 
on the merits. He professes only to "explore the relevance of Rawls's 
view for international relations" (p. 129). Even this modest explora-
tion quietly trails off into a few comments on the nature of foreign 
aid. 
Beitz establishes that nations can rationally rely on compliance 
with rules in some areas. Recent world events, however, are a re-
minder of the fragility of such patterns of reliance. Perhaps the au-
thor's failure to elaborate upon his international principles stems 
from the futility of attempting to do so. If these principles exist, but 
are weak and limited in scope, then Hobbes is correct in result and 
Beitz only adds a scholarly clarification to his theory. Are interna-
tional moral principles trivial1 Without more analysis, one cannot 
know. 
